BORDERLINES AND NATION-BUILDING: BUKOWINA
1848 TO 1947

Kurt SCHARR

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Abstract. The current drawing up of (internal and external) frontiers on the territory of the Bukovina is the result of the idea of the nation state in the 19th century. The external borders of the former Austrian crown land emerged when this territory still was in a pre-national period. They were exclusively based on political and strategic considerations. State concepts fraught with national ideas, although the Habsburg Empire tried to avoid them right to its disintegration, began to gradually split the cultural landscape. It developed in more than 100 years of political and social continuity. There was a deliberate attempt to repress the grown regional identity by restructuring borders. Even the Soviet Union, which claimed to be supranational, was not able to emerge fully from the shadow of the Russian Empire. In the end, in this case too, national ‘liberation claims’ were the driving force behind territorial greed.

In the area of Upper Moldavia the longue durée of political structures has remained particularly obvious to this day, even though the appearance has radically changed. First, the Habsburg and Russian Empires filled the power vacuum of political instability left by the Ottoman Empire. Both tried to consolidate the territory in different ways by exercising the power of a centralised state and to offer a new structure. Finally, the development of a regional identity, which had started in the late 19th century, in the course of the radicalisation of national claims during World War I, turned out to be too weak to act as a sufficient counterbalance to the latter.

For both Ukraine and Romania, the striving for national union and demarcation has been a constant and dominant factor to this day. The repeated major revisions of the frontiers of the Bukowina in the first half of the 20th century are the result of this. The artificial dividing lines between the ethnic groups, which were drawn up on the basis of the nation state ideology, became manifest in the changing territorial structure of the Bukowina after 1918.

At the moment, it is unforeseeable whether in view of this situation the historical Bukowina will be able to develop a common regional identity beyond national claims, which is supported by a majority (for instance in the Euro region Upper Pruth). Moreover, this will to a large extent depends on future European integration. Projecting national ideas of the 19th century and at the same time establishing programmatic guidelines for the future, as Ion Nistor did, is obviously not in the interest of a European spirit. It tries to overcome the nation state idea with its frontiers and promote identities that are linked to a cultural landscape.

The Bukowina is certainly a Europe en miniature in both the positive and the negative sense. The overcoming of the political nation state concept in this peripheral area of Europe thus might become an indicator of the seriousness of a new supranational Europe. The following probably applies to the cultural landscape of the Bukowina more than to any other European region: “Territory is not; it becomes, for territory itself is passive, and it is human beliefs and actions that give territory meaning.”

1 Quoted according to Waack, „Regionen“, p. 183.
In the light of history the Bukowina appears to be a Romanian country...²

Introduction

Military considerations were behind the integration of Upper Moldova into the Habsburg domain at the end of the 18th century. At that time, the modern territorial state drew clearly defined frontiers in this ‘Raum’ for the first time in history and labelled the area ‘Bukowina’. The rise of the concept of national integrity, emerging during the course of the 19th century, rendered the Bukowina as a highly fragile political construct. Although national movements increasingly developed gravitational energies, different national tensions within the Austrian Kronland (since 1848) could be retained through complicated political processes. The ‘the great seminal catastrophe’ of the 20th century caused the breakdown of this sensitive balance and the spatial as well as political entity, formed over a period of 140 years, began to disintegrate. Different kinds of irredentism (Ukrainian/Ruthenian and Romanian) began to dominate. The ideas of national irredentism were regularly and deliberately used by political leaders in order to demand and/or to justify the drawing of new frontiers.

On the other hand, these forces were opposed by the myth of a multicultural Habsburg Bukowina as a Europe en miniature – a today widely spread and willingly quoted topic, which found a broad way into western literature after 1945. Those considerations sometimes led to a false image of a better past.³ Not infrequently it served to radiance loss and the irretrievable.⁴ Today this theme, no matter to what extent it corresponds to historical reality, can make a major contribution to the formation of a new regional identity beyond existing state borders and even future European Union external borders.

Those break lines (1918, 1940, 1941, 1945, 1948) changed the ‘Kulturlandschaft’ (cultural landscape) and above all the people who shaped it with lasting effect. However, it was break lines, such as 1989-91, that gave hope to a new understanding in the region based on historically rooted common traditions – a hope finally founded on historically grown mutuality. It was preserved in this landscape and developed before 1940 and 1918. A notion of a region, which is to be comprehended as a heritage based on tolerance and mutual respect of the ‘Bukowiner Ausgleich’⁵ in 1910.

In order to understand and to overcome the ‘territorial theory of identity’⁶ rooted in the ‘long’ 19th century, concerning both neighbouring national states the Ukraine and

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⁴ See especially older and popular literature, e.g. Erich Beck, Bukowina. Land zwischen Orient und Okzident (Freilassing, 1967).
⁵ Balance, balancing of the electoral system.
Romania, which 1774 and 1918 (1940) in its long lasting structures, is part of this paper.

In this context, the following questions deserve particular attention. How did the borders of Bukowina develop in a greater European context, particularly since 1918? How were the national-ethnic claims formulated in the political sphere and finally translated into reality? Is it possible to trace continuities of dated claims with newly formulated ones despite the fundamental change of political premises (e.g. Russian Empire versus Soviet Union)?

Finally, a question concerning the implications of the EU-frontier must be raised, as it runs through Bukowina (i.e. Romania/Ukraine). The national claims are still strong on both sides of that demarcation line. In this respect, Bukowina, together with the 19th century concept of nationalism, might truly represent a Europe en miniature, albeit in a different sense.

**Bukowina since 1774**

Since the 18th century, the ‘Raum’/(space) in between the catchment area of Dniester/Дністер (Dnister) and Pruth/Прут (Prut) created a growing interest as a Théâtre de la Guerre from European powers such as Austria and Russia. They both were grasping for Ottoman territories. Earlier, it was little known as the Christian Moldovan ruler Ştefan cel Mare (Stephan the Great) showing great resistance to the Ottoman advances into Europe in the 15th century.

In 1775, the Sublime Porte ceded the remote land of Upper Moldova – the later Bukowina – to Austria. The district was of strategic significance to the Emperor in Vienna as it connected Galicia-Lodomeria (part of Austria since 1772) and Transylvania. The Austrian administration immediately started a systematic improvement of the country, using also existing structures. The Vienna government


7 The spelling of toponyms follows in general the names given in Austrian official cartography until 1918. First mentioned names of places are followed by a slash after which today’s spelling in the original alphabet is given, except for names with German equivalents (e.g. Czernowitz, Bukarest). If the Austrian spelling corresponds to the Romanian, the latter is not presented again.

aimed at strengthening the newly acquired territory and to bring it closer to the empire’s centre by building up a regional administration.

National problems in Bukowina and the ‘Ausgleich’ of 1910

The issue of ethnic groups in Bukowina was of limited importance well beyond 1848, compared to other regions in the Habsburg Monarchy. Nevertheless, the rise to the status of a ‘Kronland’ (crown land) in 1848 marked the beginning of the development of an independent regional awareness. It caused a step by step separation from Galicia. The country was part of it since 1786. Galician administration in Lemberg was negatively characterised by a creeping Polonisation (acquisition process) trying to restrain other nationalities in Bukowina (especially Ruthenians/Ukrainians and Romanians). The elevation of Bukowina to a crown land in 1848, and convocation of the regional parliament in 1861, caused the rise of an autonomous awareness inside the country. It was steadily strengthened, for example, by the foundation of the University of Czernowitz in 1875. The particular distribution of the different ethnic groups in the crown land (Ruthenians, Romanians, Germans (Jews), Lippovanes) did not allow specific groups to dominate, but required continuous cooperation and striving for consensus between all of them. Major social disparities first formed the breeding ground for internal ethnic conflicts. The constitutional balance of 1910, which was accepted and achieved by all nationalities of Bukowina, marked the zenith of this development. Radical voices, calling for an ‘Anschluss’ (joining) to their ethnic motherland, e.g. Romania, already began to rise. In spite of this, Bukowina was still progressive in comparison to the minorities’ situation in neighbouring Galicia or in Transleithania, the Kingdom of Hungary. For the time being, national conflicts found their breeding ground in social disparities. The majority of urban citizens were German speaking while the rural area was almost

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9 See Emanuel Turczynski, ‘Exogene und endogene Faktoren der Konsensbildung in der Bukowina’, Südstdeutsches Archiv 38/39 (Munich, 1995/96), pp. 97-116. The Russian part of Moldova (since 1812 Bessarabia) developed differently. The Russian administration in contrast to the Austrian in Bukowina never succeeded in transforming the new province into a bridge-head of its own imperial periphery. The advantages of this border area could not be properly instrumentalised by Russia as well. The attempt to create a popular awareness of their region in this artificial political unit – as it was successfully done in Bukowina – also failed. Bessarabia significantly lacked the basic requirements of a fairly autonomous regional administration. Since the mid-19th century Bukowina started to use this privileged position in the Moldovan area for itself. See Viktor Taki, ‘Istoricheskaia pamiati i konstruirovanie regiona posle prisoedeniia k imperii. Osobaia forma pravleniia v Bessarabii 1812-1828. gg.’, Ab Imperio 3 (2004), pp. 145-74.


11 See, for example, the attitude of the Romanian historian Ion Nistor as well as of the later president of the Romanian National Council in Bukowina, Iancu Flondor.

entirely characterised by a Romanian and Ruthenian population. This fact was used, by political powers of different directions of irredentism, to recruit their adherents.

**World War I: Break-up of the consensus**

Already in the years before the First World War, the influence of national power and territorial claims also became apparent from outside the region. During the years of war, 1914-7, these claims were getting more forceful from the Russian, as well as from the Romanian, side. Even though bilateral contracts with Russia and the Kingdom of Romania (since 1881, sovereignty since 1878) clearly defined their border lines towards Austria-Hungary, the Moldovan neighbouring area still remained to be a major territorial claim of Austria, Russia and Romania. The claims of St. Petersburg obtained a new dynamic by Russian dominated Pan-Slavism since the mid-19th century. This interest was clearly reflected in several travelogues describing the country. It gained further acuteness from the Russian side during the war period. The national union of Slavs or Romanians with the respective mother country was an overt Russian, as well as Romanian, war objective and had to be considered in the drawing of the frontier after the victory.

A few weeks after the outbreak of war in September 1914, the Russian Foreign Ministry declared its intention to unite the part of Bukowina, thought to be populated mainly by Ruthenians, with Russia. Southern Bukowina (including Czernowitz), however, belonged among the territorial concessions the Entente had made to Romania in case it entered the war against the Central Powers. In addition, the same

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region was also part of the territorial concessions of the Central Powers towards Romania. Since the reunification of the Romanian principalities (1861) and the recognition of the Romanian kingdom, the young nation state aspired toward Greater Romania covering all Romanian speaking areas, including Bukowina. In 1914, Bucharest kept its neutrality but already recognised the left bank of Pruth, without Czernowitz, as a future border in negotiations with Russia.

After achieving the armistice in late 1917, a peace agreement was enforced by the Central Powers on Romania in Bucharest on 7 May 1918. On 20 April of the same year, the Austrian authorities returned to Czernowitz, via Stříj/Стрий, from their exile in Prague and immediately started the reconstruction of the administration and of the devastated infrastructure. Having completely misjudged its weakened military and particularly the disastrous economic situation, the monarchy attempted to assert its territorial claims in Romania. They had been negotiated with Russia in the peace treaty in order to ‘round up’ the territory of the Bukowina. Subsequently, restructuring of the administration was planned in the crown land, in which Romanians and Ukrainians were to be equally treated. The county’s enlargement concerned the districts of Kimpolung/Câmpolung Moldovenesc (I), Gurahumora/Gura Humorului (II/III) and Sereth/Siret (IV/V).

As a consequence, an administrative reorganisation of the crown land was also intended. On the one hand, it was planned to install new central administration districts (‘Bezirkshauptmannschaften’) in Zurin/Цурень (Zuren’) (with the new counties Zurin and Herta/Герта VI) and Chotin/Хотин (Hotin) in the former Russian district. On the other hand, as a matter of political balance between Romanians and Ukrainians, Dorna Watra/Vatra Dornei as well as Seletin/Селятин (Seliatin) were also intended to become such districts. Henceforth, each of the nations would have enacted by law two new Bezirkshauptmannschaften.

The real situation continued to worsen, and a simmering dispute between Ukrainians and Romanians in Bukowina, which was increasingly controlled by forces outside the territory, developed into an open conflict. The establishment of a new Ukrainian crown land of the Austrian part of the empire consisting of parts of Eastern Galicia and the Bukowina, increasingly became an obstacle to further political development. The crown land was created as a minimum claim by the short-lived Ukrainian Republic during the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations. Poland and Romania fiercely opposed that plan in Vienna further paralysing Austrian domestic policy, which was already strained by the continuing war.

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21 Hotin was already administered by Austria for a short period by the end of 18th century (1788-93). See Scharr, *Bukowina*.
22 Prokopowitsch, *Das Ende*, p. 12.
23 On 8 February 1918, Austrian and Ukrainian legates signed a secret protocol in Brest-Litovsk, which intended to create a Ukrainian crown land within the monarchy. In return the Ukraine was obliged to supply food. Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof- und
Reichsrat demanded support from the government in Vienna for the foundation of a Ukrainian state. Its borders were to be included among other areas of the Bukowina to the Sereth/Siret River. The border line along the Pruth River, claimed by St. Petersburg during the war for ethnic reasons, was questioned again. As a reaction to the Ukrainians, the Romanians insisted on this border including the city of Czernowitz. In the conflict between the different ethnic groups in the Bukowina already in summer 1918 a Romanian delegate to the Landtag, Aurel Ritter von Onciul, an Austrian supporter, suggested drawing up national borders within the crown land following the tradition of the 1910 Ausgleich. Due to the political situation this plan was never realised.

The Romanian government had already declared the Bukowina part of the Kingdom in December 1918. In late 1918, however, Soviet Russia, weakened by a ravaging civil war, hardly posed any threat to the Kingdom of Romania, which belonged to the victors of World War I. During the Paris Peace Conference, Moscow could not do more than protest, against the Romanian ‘annexation’ of the Bukowina and Bessarabia (Rakovskij’s memorandum), at the French foreign ministry, which was led by Georges Clemenceau. The official Soviet diplomatic note towards the Romanian government, dated 1 May 1919, namely mentioned only Bessarabia as a part of Soviet territory. In a 1919 Pravda article the name of Bukowina was dropped.

Staatsarchiv Wien (Austrian State Archives, Family, Court and State Archive), Ministerium des Äußeren, Geheim, XLVII/128 ex 1918. Quoted according to Prokopowitsch, Das Ende, pp. 25-6.
24 Protokolle des österreichischen Ministerrates, 23 October 1918, ÖSTA-AVA. Quoted according to ibid, p. 33.
25 Staatsamt für Inneres, Zl. 2575 v. 21.1., Memorandum Etzdorf, ÖSTA-AVA. Quoted according to ibid, pp. 39-48.
26 See ibid, p. 65; Onciul, Aurel Ritter von Onciul. Onciul (1864-1921), jurist and solicitor, was also a deputy to the Landtag of Bukowina as well as to the Reichsrat in Vienna.
27 Christian Georg Rakovskij (1870-1941), since 1917 member of the Bolshevik party (since 1925 VKP(b)), one of the leaders of the Romanian labour movement. Due to political reasons he was arrested when war broke out. Russian troops liberated him from prison in Iași. After the October Revolution, he became a leading communist functionary of Soviet Ukraine (1918-1923). From 1919 to 1927 he was a member of the central committee of the RKP(b)/VKP(b). Sovetskii Enciklopedicheskii Slovar 1989; Makarov, ‘Die Eingliederung’, p. 355. »Le gouvernement ouvrier et paysan de l’Ukraine…déclare…qu’il n’acceptera jamais qu’un gouvernement hai par le peuple roumain lui-même s’installe dans la Bukovine martyre.«
28 Note by the governments of the RSFSR and the USSR to the government of Romania, 1 May 1919, signed by the people’s commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR Chicherin and the predecessor of the council of people’s commissars and the people’s commissar for foreign affairs of Soviet Russia, Ch. Rakovskij. A.A. Avdeev et al. (eds.), Sovetsko-Rumyskie otnoshenii , vol. I 1917-1934, vol. II 1935-1941 (Moscow, 2000), pp. 40-3. The first official publication of documents which was compiled in co-operation with Romania publishes the ‘Memorandum Rakovskij’ in full. In earlier publications dealing with border drawing in Bukowina after 1918 it is often maintained that Bukowina is mentioned in this memorandum though the source of information was not quite clear. Makarov, ‘Die Eingliederung’, for example quotes J. Okhotnikov and N. Batchinsky, La Bessarabie et la Paix Européenne (Paris, 1927). They obviously used an article published in Soviet press (Pravda, see footnote 29). Later publications adopted this point of view (see Hermann Weber, Die Bukowina im 2. Weltkrieg (Völkerrechtliche Aspekte der Lage der Bukowina im Spannungsfeld zwischen Rumänien, der Sowjetunion und Deutschland), (Hamburg, 1972).
altogether.\textsuperscript{29} A.N. Makarov wrote that Northern Bukowina was not touched during the historical development of Russian political relationship with its neighbours on the south-western border. This conclusion cannot be agreed with. Even though Russia raised claims to Moldovan territory by the end of 18\textsuperscript{th} century which were fulfilled by annexation of Bessarabia in 1812 (peace treaty of Bucharest) Upper Moldova (i.e. Bukowina) still remained part of foreign policy longing either from St. Petersburg or from Moscow.\textsuperscript{30} However, an enforcement of Moscow territorial demands on Northern Bukowina, as well as Bessarabia, was completely impossible at that time due to Soviet military weakness. Furthermore, no diplomatic relations existed between both states from 1918 until 1934 as Romania did not recognise Soviet Russia.\textsuperscript{31} A long term border line clearing was only achieved by the end of 1919, and during summer 1920, in the Paris peace treaties of St. Germain en Laye and Sèvres when Romania already had proclaimed the reunification of Bukowina in her historical borders with the kingdom.\textsuperscript{32} Austria definitively waived its claims to the Bukowina in Paris. Poland tried to solve their border problems with Romania in several bilateral treaties. Between 1926/28 a correction of this border was ratified. Five localities of Bukowina were handed back to Romania. Temporarily the discussion on the new drawn frontiers came to an end.\textsuperscript{33}

The new Romanian administration was keen to eliminate, once and for all, any institutional continuities dating from the period before 1918, which reminded people of the Bukowina. The Administrative Act of 1938 provided for fundamental territorial restructuring in the government of the region. By integrating the regions of pre-war Romania (Dorohoi) and former Bessarabia (Hotin) an attempt was made to replace the existing structure. In addition, the residence of the newly appointed royal governor was moved from Czernowitz to Suczawa/Suceava.\textsuperscript{34} Within the former crown land Bukowina, the territorial administration was also restructured.\textsuperscript{35} This restructuring, however, could hardly be justified as an administrative simplification. In 1938, a new regional administrative system was imposed. The former Bukowina

\textsuperscript{29} Pravda 9 February 1919, n. 30, p. 2, “The Bessarabian question – Telegram of the predecessor of the temporarily workers’ and peasants’ government of Ukraine Tovarish Rakovskij”. Rakovskij was protesting against Bratiano (predecessor of the Romanian government) who officially asked for acknowledgement of the annexation of Bukowina and Bessarabia at the peace conferences in Paris. However the article mainly refers to Bessarabia. From the Ukrainian point of view the annexation was seen as an “impertinent disrespect of the Agreement of 9 May 1918”. Translation from Russian K. Scharr.


\textsuperscript{31} See Avdeev et al., Sovetsko-Rumyskie otnosheniia, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{32} Präsidium des Ministerrates, Ferdinand I, Artikel I, 18 December 1918, Ion Nistor, Die Vereinigung der Bukowina mit Rumänien (Bucharest, 1940), p. 53.

\textsuperscript{33} See Hausleitner, Die Rumänisierung, pp. 102-14. The peace treaty of Sèvres acknowledged the border line of Czeremosch River. Five villages of Bukowina (Babin, Luka/Кострижевка (Kostrizhievka), Prelipoicze/Прилипче (Prilipche), Zwiniacze/Звенячин (Sveniatchin) and Kryszczatek/Крещатик (Kreshtchatik)) were due to reasons of railway transport given to the Republic of Poland. A mixed Romanian-Polish border commission agreed on 26 January 1926 to hand these villages back to Romania. See Nistor, Die Vereinigung, p. 56-7.

\textsuperscript{34} Hausleitner, Die Rumänisierung, p. 310.

\textsuperscript{35} The Austrian law of administration was enacting until 1925. In consequence it was replaced by a significant more centralistic law of administrative unification on 14 June 1925. See Prokopowitsch, Das Ende, p. 62.
now formed Ţinut Suceava (region Rom. = Ţinut), though with its capital in Czernowitz36 (Rom. Cernăuţi). ‘Bukowina’ as a term disappeared in official documents. The districts were radically restructured. The Judeţ Radauți (district Rom. = Judeţ), for instance, suddenly covered the former autonomous district of Wiznitz/Вижниця (Wischnitzja, Rom. Viniţa) as well as the region of Putila and Uşcie Putila/Усть-Путила (Ust'-Putila) in the north of the watershed. The Judeţ Storojinet (Storozynetz/Сторохинец, Rom. Storojinet) absorbed part of former Wiznitz district remaining, as well as the whole district of Waschkoutz/Вашкивці (Waschkiwzi, Rom. Văşcuţ). After the reform the new Judeţ Cernăuţi included the former Austrian districts of Kotzman/Кизман (Kizman’, Rom. Cosmeni) and Zastawna/Заставна (Rom. Zastavna).37 If that new structure was compared with the distribution of the ethnic groups, based on an Austrian census of 1910, a well-founded suspicion would arise that there was a deliberate attempt to try to move the majorities in the new districts to the benefit of the Romanian, and to the detriment of the Ukrainian, population.

The pendulum swings back: the Soviet Union gains strength again

The Soviet Union needed just over two decades to regain strength in foreign policy and to apply the necessary pressure on Romania. Under the shadow of the Hitler-Stalin-Pact, the Soviet Union was able to realise the older Russian, as well as Soviet, claim for Northern Bukowina in 1940, which was still based on ethnic justification. Immediately after Hitler’s aggression against Poland in 1939, a certain fear from the Romanian side, about Soviet pretensions on Romanian territory and spheres of influence, took place in political life.38 That fear was steadily growing until June 1940, additionally reinforced by an increasing concentration of Soviet military units along the Dniester River.39

On 23 June 1940, Soviet foreign minister Viacheslav M. Molotov (as agreed upon in the Hitler-Stalin-Pact) handled the then Romanian ambassador in Moscow, Gheorghe Davidecu, an ultimatum asserting Soviet claims to the Bukowina and Bessarabia. Therein ethnic argumentation played a major role beside the standardised one of class conflict. The ambassador replied that Bukowina has never been part of Russia. He got a lapidary answer from Molotov that the Soviet Union only calls for the northern part of the country mainly populated by Ukrainians.40 The new frontier,

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36 From June 1940 until June 1941 and from 1944 onwards Czernowitz was called in Russian Черновцы (Chernovzy), since 1991 in Ukrainian Чернівці (Chernivzi). During the Romanian period it was called Cernăuţi.
37 See Constantin Teodorescu, România pe judeţe cu nuova organizare administrativă, 1:1.000.000, (Braşov, 1939) – Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna.
38 Telegram, Romanian ambassador in the USA R. Irimescu to Romanian ministry of foreign affairs, 6 September 1939, Avdeev et al., Sovetsko-Rumyskie otnosheniia, p. 240.
39 Telegram, Romanian ambassador in the USSR G. Davidecu to Romanian ministry of foreign affairs, 18 June 1940, ibid, pp. 301-2.
40 “The government of the Soviet Union thinks that the question of the restitution of Bessarabia is organically linked to the return of that part of the Bukowina to the Soviet Union as well as to the common historical fate, the common language and the ethnic composition of the overwhelming majority of its population with Soviet Ukraine … Currently, the Soviet Union does not ask the question about the entire territory of the Bukowina, but only about its
intended by the Soviet Union, was to run across the Bukowina and was not based on any pre-existing (administrative) borderlines. It corresponded, however, largely to the earlier proposal made by Onciul.41

The Soviet Union in a way confronted the Kingdom of Romania with a fait accompli, because at this moment a map, and extensive newspaper articles about the enlargement of the territory, had already been printed.42 The newspaper Izvestia, for instance, dedicated the entire front page of its issue of 29 June to the affair and published at the same time Soviet claims to Romania.43 A few months after the annexation of Northern Bukowina, a Soviet propaganda film was shot, showing the glorious liberation of Bukowina. The policy of Romanisation by the Bucharest government was obviously emphasised in the film. The setting was ‘reunification’ of the northern part with its ‘socialistic motherland’. A great importance was attached to liberation from bourgeois rule. Everywhere in the city of Czernowitz (sic!), peasants were dancing in Huzul costumes, a Huzul wedding ceremony was staged or Huzul mountain settlements of Bukowina were focused upon. National Ukrainian music of the region could be heard in the background. The presence of other nationalities was kept quiet, except for Romanian ‘oppressors’ or black marketers symbolising the former ruling class.44 The demarcation line, claimed by the Soviets in 1919 and put northern region, whose population is mainly composed of Ukrainians …” Protocol of the meeting of people’s commissar V.M. Molotov with the Romanian ambassador in the USSR Davidescu, 26 June 1940, ibid, pp. 310-5. Translation K. Scharr.

41 “Concerning the border demanded from us in Bukowina and shown to me on the map, she runs as follows: from the Southwest (former Polish) to Šipotele, along the valley of the Suceava until the river turns to the South, towards the North to Frătăuți Noi and in north-eastern direction to the border with Bessarabia, on the territory of Herza parish. He assured that the railway line from Suceava to Radauți will remain Romanian…”, Telegram, Romanian ambassador in the USSR, G. Davidescu, to Romanian ministry of foreign affairs, 27 June 1940, ibid, pp. 318, 323-6, 336. According to this, one might not speak about an ‘accidental incorporation’ like Oleg Serebrian does. See Oleg Serebrian, ‘Republik Moldau. Ethnische, historische geopolitische Grenzen’, Cay Lienau (ed.), Ethnizität, Identität und Nationalität in Südeuropa. Beiträge zu einem Präsentationstag der Südosteuropa-Forschung an der Universität Münster am 27. 11. 1998 (Munich, 2000), p. 407-17, here p. 410. Serebrian is historian at the University of Chișinău and president of the Social-Liberal party of Moldava.

42 Protocol of the meeting of V.M. Molotov with the Romanian ambassador in the USSR Davidescu, 29 June 1940. Typical for the behaviour of Soviet politicians towards inferior opponents was the way the meeting was arranged. Molotov invited the ambassador at 11.00 p.m. into the people’s commissariat. When Davidescu replied that he could phone Bucharest only between 4.00 and 7.00 p.m., Molotov answered that this might be organised immediately. Protocol of the meeting of V.M. Molotov with Davidescu, 26 June 1940. Avdeev et al., Sovetskko-Rumyskie otosheniiia, pp. 314, 333-5.

43 “Another victory of the peace policy of the Soviet Union…Yesterday at 2.00 p.m. our glorious Red Army heroically crossed the Romanian border, which in 1918 was forced upon the young Soviet Republic by the Western European imperialist powers through all kinds of plotting and scheming and which has never been recognised by the Soviet Union…” Central headline of this page: “The population of Bessarabia and North Bukowina, welcomed by the family of nations of the socialist home country, brotherly greets the workers of the Soviet Union”. Izvestia 29 July 1940, p. 1. Translation K. Scharr.

44 The film is preserved in the Ukrainian state archive of Czernowitz. The author of the article owns a video copy. “Bukovina zemlia ukrainskaia. Ocherk iz istorii i etnografii kraia” (“Bukowina Ukrainian land. Historical and ethnographical digest of the region”). Scenario, cut
into reality in 1940, was not changed even after the war. Albeit official Romania tried to draw the world’s attention towards this unjustified territorial loss by publishing several apologetic pro memoriae. Those arguments could not find any support in realpolitik. The Soviet annexation of the Bukowina was met with Romanian incomprehension all the more as it far exceeded the earlier claims of a border along the river Pruth. The Soviet Union claimed the northern part of the territory including the city of Czernowitz, which was mainly populated by Ukrainians. Once again, Romania considered itself the victim of a diplomatic game and compared the situation to 1775. In the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty with Romania, that cession was recognised by the international community. However, it happened under changed political circumstances of the signatory powers (Romania was already a country ruled by Communists). The recognition has been effective to this day. Subsequently, in the Soviet Bukowina too, massive restructuring in the internal administrative division of the present Tchernivecka Oblast’ (Чернівецька

county ruled by Communists).

and direction Iu. Solnceva (Studio Kiev, 1940). The Soviet film team paid a lot of people working as supernumeraries and was very strict on their outward appearance. Friendly hint by Mr. Peter Demant, who participated as a Romanian looking supernumerary, Moscow February 2005. Post-war Soviet films liked to pick out the central theme of liberation myth in Bukowina. See “Belaia ptica s chornom otmetinoi” (“The white bird with the black stain”), Iurii Il’enko (1972). The film director tells the fate of a poor (Ukrainian) peasant family in northern Bukowina before and during World War II under Romanian rule. 45 1948-9/1979 as well as in 1961-2/1969-73 only small revisions of the state border between the USSR and Romania were made. Voenno-Kartograficheskaia fabrika, Ukraina – Chernovickaia Oblast’ 1:200.000, (Kiev, 1999).

45 See Nistor, Die Vereinigung. Sammlung deutscher, italienischer und magyarischer Karten, die die ethnische Lage Rumäniens, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die westlichen Gebiete, darstellen (1857-1930) (Bucharest, 1940). The Royal Academy in Bucharest tried especially to draw the world’s attention towards the fact that Romania “…did not take anything which did not belong to Romania anyway…” Furthermore the Academy expressed that Romania was completely surprised by the Soviet ultimatum of 26 June 1940 “…like a lightning coming out of the clear sky…” Rumänische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Hg.), Denkschrift betreffend Bessarabien und die Nord-Bukowina mit einer ethnographischen Karte (Bucharest, 1940), pp. 3-4. Translation K. Scharr.

46 The Academy’s memorandum points out that even official Russian statistics before 1914 clearly indicate that the majority of citizens in Bessarabia were of Romanian mother tongue. “As we were posed by a tragic fate into this position we observe in Bukowina with pain how the diplomatic game of the year 1775 is repeated once more and how a Romanian region with an old orthodox archbishopric, a Romanian university, a Romanian library containing more than a half million books” is violently separated from its mother land. Translation K. Scharr.

47 Regarding the German Reich it was underlined that even the post World War I reunification was also acknowledged at the general assembly in 1918 by representatives of the German minority in Bukowina. Rumänische Akademie der Wissenschaften (ed.), Denkschrift, pp. 4, 7-8.

Область (Oblast’ = district in Russian) took place. A detachment from Romania alone led to an enlargement of the Northern Bukowina. Herța/Герца and the northern Bessarabic areas of Nowosielitza/Новоселиця (Rom. Noua Sulită) – Hotin – Kelmiency/Кельменці – Sikureni/Скиреня became part of Tchernivecka Oblast’.49

Up to the 1990s the situation between Romania and the Ukrainian SSR was kept the same to a large extent. The border crossing (at Porubne – Вадул Сирет (Rom. Vadul Siret)) was strongly restricted and private persons seldom got permission. Only after 1991 bilateral talks, between Romania and Ukraine, as well as Moldova, started. They finally resulted in the facilitation of border crossing and in the foundation of the Euro region Upper Pruth in 2000.50 As one of the first steps, bilingual town signs, in the ethnically mixed area on both sides of the state border, were erected (at least alongside the main traffic routes). In the same time Bucharest granted significant travel facilitation to Romanian youngsters from Ukraine and Moldova. Special scholarships enabled them to study at Romanian schools and universities. Intensive border crossing trade was established. During the first years, small and middle size trading, mostly informal, tried to flood Romania with deficit products from Ukraine. A wholesale market (Калинівський Ринок/Kalinovs’kii Rynok) was established in Czernowitz. The market has served as an important centre of distribution for a large variety of products from all over Western Ukraine. Until summer 2004 that market was intensively frequented by traders of the near Romanian, southern part of the Bukowina. In terms of traffic and trade the dividing frontier seemed to be overcome. Small, private taxi companies offered cheap transport in between the two capitals (Czernowitz and Suceava) of the divided region in competition with the busses of state owned enterprises. On 16 July 2004, the implementation of a visa regime on both sides – as a preliminary condition for Romania’s joining the European Community in 2007 – caused a drastic caesura. Even though it is currently quite easy to obtain a visa, a tightening became clear in 2007. Many Ukrainian citizens in the region tried to prove their Romanian ancestry to receive a second (Romanian, finally ‘European’) citizenship. Facing the economically miserable situation in Ukraine, this became one possibility to enter the EU labour market.

The relationship between Kiev and Bucharest is still very frozen at the diplomatic level. Albeit in 1997 a treaty of good neighbourhood and cooperation was signed, though Romania demanded firstly an official challenge to the Hitler-Stalin-Pact with the cession of Northern Bukowina. Finally it was possible to find a formula accepted by both sides.51

49 Vikonavchii komitet chernivetskoi radi deputativ trudiashchikh (ed.), Dovidnik administrativno-territorial’noho podilu chernivetsk’koi oblasti stanom na 1 zhovtnia 1976 roku (Chernivtsi, 1976). Currently there are no updated maps concerning the administrative division of the southern, Romanian part of Bukowina. Friendly hint by Dr. Ștefan Purici, University Suceava, Institute of Geography and History, December 2004.
The Romanian Orthodox Church still claims the entire Bukowina in the jurisdiction of her diocese.\(^5\) When talking to Romanians and Ukrainians that separating, and very national, point of view was often mentioned with one remarkable difference. Czernowitz tended to refer towards its multicultural as well as Romanian past and presence,\(^5\) e.g., a new monument for Mihai Eminescu (1850-1889) and a memorial tablet in honour of the Romanian composer Ciprian Porumbescu (1853-1883) were erected at central places in the city. Suceava, placing itself as a former capital of historic Moldova, almost totally lacked such attributes of mutual respect.

Though these observations were mainly collected incidentally and there are not yet any systematic studies on this question one might apparently spot a significant difference between both parts of the former historic region. As the North tries to go along with the Austrian tradition,\(^5\) not forgetting the own national Ukrainian past,\(^5\) the South strongly keeps the tradition of the historic principality Moldova.\(^5\)

**REFERENCES**


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\(^5\) More than a third of the deputies in Czernowitz regional parliament (Oblasna Rada) are of Romanian mother tongue. Jordan, Klemenčič, *Transcarpathia*, p. 221.

\(^5\) The official motto of today’s Ukrainian Czernowitz city council is, for example, ‘viribus unitis’. It is the same as Emperor Franz Joseph I (1830-1916) used during his reign (1848-1916).

\(^5\) For instance, the official celebrations of 1,000 years of Hotin in 2001.

\(^5\) For example, the official celebrations, in honor of the 500\(^{th}\) anniversary of the funeral of Stefan the Great in Putna, in summer 2004.
Teodorescu C. (1939), România pe județe cu nouă organizare administrativă, 1:1,000,000, Brașov, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna.


*** Pravda 9, February 1919, n. 30, p. 2.

Institut für Geographie Leopold-Franzens
Universität Innsbruck
Austria
Email: Kurt.Scharr@uibk.ac.at